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INTRODUCTION 
“Cloud computing,” an amorphous and often 
misunderstood term, references an Internet-based 
methodology that service providers and web-based entities 
commonly use.  The majority of Internet users unknowingly 
encounter cloud computing in their casual day-to-day web 
browsing.  So-called “Web 2.0 applications,” such as Gmail, 
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Facebook, and LinkedIn, all utilize cloud computing.  In a 
nutshell, all processing and data retention occurs away from 
the user’s computer, in a cloud computing application at a 
service provider’s remote location. 
More and more companies are taking advantage of cloud 
computing services offered by providers such as Amazon, 
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!.1  These cloud computing 
service providers allow companies to replace their expensive 
and aging technological infrastructure with third-party 
processing and storage capabilities that are accessible over 
the Internet.2  Not only does this option save on overhead and 
infrastructure costs, but the cloud computing service 
providers also offer flexible pricing on a pay-for-use basis that 
offers attractive scalability.3  This service permits easy access 
over the Internet or over a private network from any location, 
so that computer software and data may be readily available 
whenever and wherever.4 
There are three basic types of cloud computing services: 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Software as a Service 
(SaaS), and Platform as a Service (PaaS).5  There are also 
four models for deployment of these services: private, public, 
community, and hybrid.6  This Comment focuses exclusively 
upon private SaaS cloud services because they are the most 
commonly used type and model. 
Private SaaS clouds permit access to a provider’s 
software applications running on cloud infrastructure 
maintained for the benefit of a solitary enterprise.7  The 
enterprise contracts with the provider to supply it with 
solutions to its particular business needs, such as data 
retention or remote database access.  These solutions, 
contained entirely in the cloud, are considered private 
because the solutions are only accessible by the enterprise 
that is paying for the provider’s services. 
 
 
 1. Mark L. Austrian & W. Michael Ryan, Cloud Computing Meets E-
Discovery, CYBERSPACE LAW., July 2009, at 1. 
 2. See id. 
 3. W. Michael Ryan & Cristopher M. Loeffler, Insights into Cloud 
Computing, 22 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 22, 22 (2010). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. at 22–23. 
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As more companies incorporate cloud computing into 
their day-to-day activities, their data accumulates in the 
cloud.  Where this electronically stored information (ESI) 
goes, electronic discovery often soon follows.8  A company that 
becomes involved in litigation may thereafter be required to 
produce some of the data that is stored in the cloud by the 
service provider. 
Requests for the production of ESI can come in the form 
of a Rule 34 motion to compel production9 or a Rule 45 
subpoena directing a third-party service provider to produce 
ESI.10  It would be prudent for companies to take preemptory 
measures to ensure that their third-party cloud computing 
service provider does not engage in spoliation, or the deletion, 
of ESI.  Otherwise, a company involved in litigation may be 
subjected to sanctions for the deletion of ESI by its third-
party service provider.11 
Part I.A will address the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) applicable to electronic discovery.12  Part I.B will 
discuss the application of the three elements of the Zubulake 
IV framework to ESI in the cloud, which provide a starting 
point for the mitigation of liability for discovery sanctions.13  
Finally, Part II will discuss how a company can reduce its 
liability by inserting protective electronic-discovery-specific 
provisions into the service agreement with its third-party 
cloud computing service provider.14 
I. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN THE CLOUD 
With the relatively new introduction of electronic 
discovery procedures, by way of the 2006 Amendments to the 
FRCP, case law is still fleshing out and adapting the 
electronic discovery procedures with respect to today’s 
 
 8. David D. Cross & Emily Kuwahara, E-Discovery and Cloud Computing: 
Control of ESI in the Cloud, EDDE J., Spring 2010, at 2. 
 9. FED. R. CIV. P. 34. 
 10. FED. R. CIV. P. 45. 
 11. See, e.g., Bowman v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-7871, 1998 WL 
721079, *4 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 9, 1998) (holding that a prosthetic implant 
production company was held liable for spoliation of evidence in a product 
liability suit even though such evidence was throw out by a third-party doctor). 
 12. See infra Part I.A. 
 13. See infra Part I.B. 
 14. See infra Part II. 
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technologies.15  To add further uncertainty, companies are 
rapidly employing the use of third-party cloud computing 
data processing and retention services—an unexplored 
territory of jurisprudence.16  Given the lack of jurisprudence 
in applying the electronic discovery rules to third parties, it is 
difficult to predict the outcome of electronic discovery 
disputes. 
Parties involved in litigation may stretch to draw 
comparisons between past cases concerning tangible data 
held by third-parties and present scenarios where intangible 
data is held by a third-party cloud computing service 
provider.17  But, the amount of administerial power held by 
the third-party cloud computing service provider over ESI is 
too dissimilar to draw a valid comparison.18  For example, the 
third-party cloud computing service provider has more control 
than an average third-party maintaining paper copies of data, 
because the third-party cloud computing service provider is 
contracted to replace a company’s existing data retention and 
processing infrastructure.  In addition, the third-party cloud 
computing service provider may exercise its ability to alter or 
destroy the company’s data subject to the service provider’s  
routine deletion procedures.19 
A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Applicable to Electronic 
Discovery 
The 2006 Amendments20 to the FRCP21 paved the way for 
 
 15. See Cross & Kuwahara, supra note 8, at 3. 
 16. See Oregon v. Beller, 217 P.3d 1094, 1111 n.11 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) 
(Sercombe, J., dissenting).  This is the only judicial opinion that expressly 
mentions cloud computing, and, even then, it is only mentioned in a footnote. 
 17. See generally Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 354 (E.D. Mich. 
2008); In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
Tomlinson v. El Paso Corp., 245 F.R.D. 474, 477 (D. Colo. 2007). 
 18. See Cross & Kuwahara, supra note 8, at 5. 
 19. The safe harbor provision in Rule 37 may shield third parties from 
routine, good-faith deletion of ESI.  FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 20. 2006 FRCP amendments applicable to this comment chiefly include 
those to Rules 26, 34, 37, and 45. 
 21. A discovery conference in 1996 first addressed the unique problems 
associated with the discovery of electronically stored information.  Judicial 
Conf. of the U.S., Summary Rep. of the Comm. on the FED. R. CIV. P. app. C, at 
18, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rule/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2011).  After the Advisory Comm.’s comment, published Aug. 
2004, and three public hearings the Advisory Comm. submitted their newly 
revised proposed amendments to the Standing Comm.  Id.  After approval by 
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today’s complex electronic discovery procedures.22  It is 
worthwhile to take a closer look at the rules’ functions in 
order to determine how cloud computing service providers 
may fit into the overall procedural scheme. 
Of vital importance to the 2006 Amendments, Rule 
26(a)(1)(A) lays the groundwork for the practice of electronic 
discovery, stating that: 
[A] party must without awaiting a discovery request, 
provide to other parties: . . . (ii) a copy – or a description by 
category and location – of all documents, electronically 
stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing 
party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use 
to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be 
solely for impeachment.23 
Although electronically stored information may be 
voluntarily produced under Rule 26(a), a party may also 
obtain ESI in other ways.  One of these ways for a party 
seeking ESI is to draft a motion to compel the discovery of 
ESI,24 within the scope prescribed by Rule 26(b), on an 
opposing party.25  For instance, the plaintiff in Zubulake IV 
filed a motion to compel the production of e-mails in a sex 
discrimination suit.26  In order to compel production in this 
 
the Standing Comm., the Judicial Conf. approved the proposed amendments on 
Sept. 20, 2005.  JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., REP. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S. 37 (2005).  However, they are considered the 2006 
amendments to the FRCP because that is the year they went into effect. 
 22. See Tanya L. Forsheit, E-Discovery Involving Cloud Facilities, 1010 
PLI/PAT 157, 159–68 (2010). 
 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 24. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A). 
A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of 
Rule 26(b) to produce and permit the requesting party or its 
representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in 
the responding party’s possession, custody, or control: any designated 
documents or electronically stored information . . . stored in any 
medium from which information can be obtained either directly . . . . 
Id. 
 25. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information 
from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible 
because of undue burden or cost.  On motion to compel discovery or for 
a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must show 
that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost. 
Id. 
 26. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 
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manner, the moving party must specify the form of 
production for the ESI.27  In the absence of such a stipulation 
or court order, with respect to the form of production, a 
producing party must produce ESI in the form in which it is 
ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form.28  In 
addition to the two mechanisms described above, a party may 
subpoena a non-party service provider to produce ESI 
pursuant to Rule 45.29  For example, in Flagg, the plaintiff 
subpoenaed the defendant-city’s text messaging provider for 
production of text messages concerning an alleged murder.30 
Yet, there are two exceptions that may enable the court 
to deny a requesting party’s motion to compel the production 
of ESI.  ESI need not be produced in the two following 
situations: (1) if the ESI is not readily accessible due to undue 
burden or cost;31 or  (2) if the balance between the ESI’s 
benefit and its evidentiary importance or production expense 
weighs against the moving party.32  Rule 26 also grants the 
 
215 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 27. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1) (“The request must describe with reasonable 
particularity each item or category to be inspected; must specify a reasonable 
time, place, and manner for the inspection and for performing related acts; and 
may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored information is to be 
produced.”); see, e.g., Wyeth v. Impax Labs., Inc., 248 F.R.D. 169 (D. Del. 2006). 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E). 
Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, these procedures 
apply to producing documents or electronically stored information: A 
party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of 
business . . . ; if a request does not specify a form for producing 
electronically stored information, a party must produce it in a form or 
forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable 
form or forms . . . . 
Id.; see, e.g., Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640 (D. Kan. 
2005). 
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(D) (“A command in a subpoena to produce a 
document, electronically stored information, or tangible things requires the 
responding party to permit inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of the 
materials.”). 
 30. See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
 31. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 32. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of 
discovery . . . if it determines that . . . the burden of expense of the 
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of 
the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of 
the discovery in resolving the issues. 
Id. 
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trial court substantial latitude in deciding whether a 
discovery request constitutes an undue burden that would 
justify not producing the requested ESI.33  Lastly, Rule 37 
includes a safe harbor provision that may shield the non-
moving party from the imposition of sanctions for failing to 
produce ESI, if the requested ESI has been lost as a result of 
the routine, good faith operation of an electronic information 
system.34 
B. Application of the Zubulake IV Framework to the 
Spoliation of ESI in the Cloud 
It is essentially Judge Scheindlin’s opinion in Zubulake 
IV that created a framework for analyzing the spoliation of 
electronically stored information.35  The Judiciary Committee 
borrowed heavily from Scheindlin’s framework to draft the 
2006 Amendments to the FRCP, which are discussed above.36 
In Zubulake IV,37 the plaintiff, a former equities trader 
for UBS, filed a complaint against UBS for gender 
discrimination for failure to promote and retaliation.38  
During the discovery process, the plaintiff requested e-mail 
correspondence sent between various UBS employees that 
were exclusively stored on UBS’ proprietary computer 
systems.39  Due to UBS’ failure to preserve the e-mail 
correspondence, the plaintiff sought to impose discovery 
sanctions against UBS.40  The court, in rendering its opinion, 
created an analytical framework for the party seeking to 
 
 33. Erin Marie Secord, Exploring Challenges with the Discovery of Text 
Messages in Federal Cases Through the Lens of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Stored Communications Act, 15 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. 
ADOV. 143, 146 (2010). 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may 
not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide 
electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith 
operation of an electronic information system.”). 
 35. See Cross & Kuwahara, supra note 8, at 9–10. 
 36. See Maria Perez Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing 
Vulnerability of Electronic Information, 58 S.C. L. REV. 7, 15 (2006) 
(maintaining that the “series of rulings by Judge Scheindlin in the Zubulake 
litigation have shaped the contours of electronic discovery and provide an 
example of how electronic discovery issues emerge within litigation”). 
 37. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 215. 
 40. See id. 
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impose sanctions for spoliation, or the deletion, of evidence.41  
The framework provides that the seeker must establish the 
following three elements, in order to prevail on such a motion: 
(1) that the party having control over the evidence had an 
obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; 
(2) that the records were destroyed with a culpable state of 
mind; and 
(3) that the destroyed evidence was relevant to the party’s 
claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could 
find that it would support that claim or defense. 42 
In order to avoid falling victim to situations similar to 
UBS’, a company contemplating entering into a contract, or 
currently in a contract, with a third-party cloud computing 
service provider should consider, and incorporate, safeguard 
provisions in their service contract as well as enact 
accompanying company policies to avoid sanctions for the 
spoliation, or deletion of ESI. 
1. Mitigating Liability Under Prong I of the Zubulake 
IV Framework 
Under the first element of the Zubulake IV analysis, a 
company should not fear the imposition of sanctions, unless 
“the party having control over the evidence had an obligation 
to preserve it at the time it was destroyed.”43  This element 
also implicates a series of secondary considerations, including 
(a) the date on which the duty to preserve is triggered, (b) the 
scope of the duty to preserve, which includes the key players 
in litigation and the lifeline of ESI, and (c) the format in 
which the ESI is to be produced.  Finally, the party, upon 
which a production request is placed, must, in fact, (d) have 
necessary possession, custody, or control of the ESI. 
i. Trigger Date for a Litigation Hold 
Generally, “[t]he duty to preserve material evidence 
arises not only during litigation but also extends to that 
period before the litigation when a party reasonably should 
know that the evidence may be relevant to the anticipated 
 
 41. See id. at 220. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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litigation.”44  Other circuit courts, however, require more 
certainty as to whether litigation is likely before the duty to 
preserve arises, whereby “litigation must be probable rather 
than a [mere] possibility, and the path to litigation must be 
clear and immediate.”45  Yet, some circuit courts construe 
anticipation more broadly whereby the litigation hold is 
triggered when the defendant corporation retained counsel in 
connection with legal action but had yet to identify an 
allegedly responsible party.46  In light of the uncertainty of 
the split among circuit courts apropos, the trigger of a 
litigation hold, the best practice and a “helpful analytical tool 
[for determining when the duty to preserve attaches] is the 
more widely developed standard for anticipation of litigation 
under the work product doctrine.”47  Work product doctrine 
protection attaches to documents “prepared because of the 
prospect of litigation when the preparer faces an actual or a 
potential claim following an actual event or series of events 
that reasonably could result in litigation.”48 
The simplest measure to prevent the imposition of 
sanctions is a company’s ability to quickly put a litigation 
hold into place.  The company needs to be able to implement a 
litigation hold on data retained by their third-party cloud 
computing service provider once they reasonably anticipate 
litigation,49 subject to several small wrinkles in different 
 
 44. Id. at 216 n.13 (citing Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d 
Cir. 1999)). 
 45. Hynix Semicond., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1062 (N.D. 
Cal. 2006) (holding that litigation must be probable, rather than a possibility 
and the path to litigation must be clear and immediate before the duty to 
preserve arises); see, e.g., Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 
244 F.R.D. 614, 621 (D. Colo. 2007) (stating that “[w]hile a party shouldn’t be 
permitted to destroy potential evidence after receiving unequivocal notice of 
impending litigation, the duty to preserve relevant documents should require 
more than a mere possibility of litigation.”); Treppel v. Biovail Corp., 233 F.R.D. 
363, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that the mere existence of a dispute does not 
necessarily mean that parties should reasonably anticipate litigation or that the 
duty to preserve arises). 
 46. Innis Arden Golf Club v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 334, 340 (D. 
Conn. 2009). 
 47. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Rambus, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 524, 542 (E.D. Va. 
2006). 
 48. Id. (citing Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 
980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 49. See Samsung Elecs. Co., 439 F. Supp. 2d at 542.  The best practice for 
determining the trigger date for a litigation hold should be the more widely 
developed standard for anticipation of litigation under the work product 
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circuits’ jurisprudence.50  This may be accomplished by 
contracting for the right, in a company’s service agreement 
with a third-party cloud computing service provider, to stop 
the routine destruction of data at the discretion of the 
company’s general counsel or officer.  If ESI is preserved in 
the first instance, there is no need to advance to the second 
and third prongs of the Zubulake IV analysis because the last 
two prongs require ESI to be destroyed. 
ii. Scope of the Duty to Preserve ESI 
The duty to preserve ESI does not apply to every 
document a company has ever created, or will create.  
Instead, “[a] party or anticipated party must retain all 
relevant documents (but not multiple identical copies) in 
existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches, and any 
relevant documents created thereafter.”51  For example, an e-
mail correspondence drafted by a supervisor concerning an 
employee’s performance review for a promotion in an 
employment discrimination case would be subject to the duty 
to preserve.52  This, however, does not mean that a 
corporation, upon recognizing a threat of litigation, must 
preserve every shred of paper or every file of ESI, because 
such a stringent rule would serve to cripple large corporations 
that produce voluminous amounts of ESI and are frequently 
engaged involved in litigation.53 
The duty to preserve is not so draconian; on the contrary, 
it extends only to “individuals likely to have discoverable 
information that the disclosing party may use to support its 
claims and defenses.”54  Thus, the duty covers persons “likely 
to have relevant information—the ‘key players’ in the case.”55 
The scope of discovery of the preservation duty is further 
restricted by the accessibility of the ESI in its current 
 
doctrine. 
 50. See generally supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 51. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 52. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 312–
13 (S.D.N.Y 2003); see also Bellinger v. Astrue, CV-06-321 (CBA), 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 71727, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009). 
 53. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217. 
 54. Id. at 218. 
 55. Id. 
YSMITH FINAL 11/14/2012  1:01 AM 
2012] ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 1571 
condition.56  In Zubulake I, five categories of data were 
described from the most to the least accessible: 
(1) Active, online data: data generally stored on magnetic 
disk that is used in the very active stages of an electronic 
record’s life (e.g., data on hard drives); 
(2) Near-line data: data stored on a robotic storage device 
that houses removable media (e.g., optical disks); 
(3) Offline storage/archives: data on removable optical disk 
or magnetic tape media traditionally used for making 
disaster copies of records and also for records considered 
archival; 
(4) Backup tapes: a device, like a tape recorder, that reads 
data from and writes it onto a tape; and 
(5) Erased, fragmented or damaged data: as files are 
erased, their previous contiguous clusters are made 
available again as free space and the broken up files are 
randomly placed throughout the disk.57 
Although this is a somewhat dated description of the 
categories within the lifeline of digital information, it still 
serves as a guidepost for the accessibility of ESI as it evolves 
from primary to archival data.58  However, since it generally 
takes the law some time to catch up with and adapt to 
technology, the lifeline of ESI, as it shifts from a readily 
accessible active format to inaccessible data, presents a 
continuing challenge to the scope of the duty to preserve.59 
Since the scope of the duty to preserve, triggered by 
anticipated or ongoing litigation, is determined largely upon 
who has accumulated and retained data in the cloud, it is 
imperative for a company to be able to quickly identify the 
relevant key players involved in the corresponding litigation 
when implementing a litigation hold.  This objective may be 
realized if the company inserts flexibility into their service 
agreement with their third-party cloud computing service 
provider.  Such flexibility would require the company to be 
able to easily access and place a non-deletion hold on a key 
player’s ESI that is stored in the cloud by a simple search 
 
 56. Crist, supra note 36, at 30. 
 57. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 319. 
 58. See Crist, supra note 36, at 26. 
 59. Id. 
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function.  The ability to identify key players in order to 
implement a litigation hold may be further achieved by 
integrating a clause into the service agreement, employment 
contracts, and company handbooks, that enables the 
company’s general counsel, or specified officer, to exercise 
discretion over placing a litigation hold on any employee, 
considered a key player to the anticipated or ongoing 
litigation, and who has or continues to use of the service 
provider’s cloud computing applications. 
The scope of a key players’ ESI that must be preserved 
includes “all relevant documents (but not multiple identical 
copies) in existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches, 
and any relevant documents created thereafter.”60  A 
company’s service agreement with their third-party cloud 
computing service provider must therefore articulate a 
certain amount of flexibility in order to effectuate the 
company’s ability to retrieve the proper documents and to 
adapt to the corresponding suit they are engaged in because 
no two cases will require the same suite of ESI to be produced 
to a requesting party. 
Compliance with the scope of the duty to preserve may 
also be achieved in a manner that is similar to selecting 
which employees’ ESI to preserve.  The company should 
contract for, in the service agreement with their third-party 
cloud computing service provider, the right to retrieve and 
preserve certain types of documents relevant to the 
anticipated or ongoing litigation in an easily searchable and 
definable manner.  The service agreement should state that 
this right remains at the discretion of the company’s general 
counsel, or a specified officer similarly equipped with the 
authority and competence to make such a determination. 
iii. Format for the Production of ESI 
A company that employs a third-party cloud computing 
service provider needs to be mindful of the format in which it 
may be compelled to produce ESI in future litigation when 
drafting its service agreement.  Generally, a party that 
produces documents for inspection shall, pursuant to Rule 34, 
produce them as they are kept in the usual course of business 
or shall organize and label them to correspond with the 
 
 60. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 218. 
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categories in the request.61  Rule 34, in turn, raises issues 
such as whether the ESI should be produced with 
“metadata”—which is defined as data about the data62—and 
whether the ESI should be produced in its native file format 
or some other format.63 
In determining whether metadata should be produced 
under a Rule 34 request, the court in Williams v. 
Sprint/United Management Co.64 faced a question of first 
impression and looked to the Sedona Principles for 
guidance.65  The party seeking ESI requested that 
spreadsheets be produced with their original metadata intact, 
instead of being produced in a TIFF image format.66  The 
court agreed with the requesting party by reasoning that in 
light of emerging standards, “the producing party should 
produce the electronic documents with their metadata intact, 
unless the party timely objects to production of the metadata, 
the parties agree that the metadata should not be produced, 
or the producing party requests a protective order.”67  The 
initial burden, with regard to disclosure of metadata, is thus 
placed on the producing party.68 
 
 
 61. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E). 
 62. Adam K. Israel, To Scrub or Not to Scrub: The Ethical Implications of 
Metadata and Electronic Data Creation, Exchange, and Discovery, 60 ALA. L. 
REV. 469, 469 (2009).  “As a general rule of thumb, the more interactive the 
application, the more important the metadata is to understanding the 
application’s output.”  Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 647 
(D. Kan. 2005).  The basic metadata characteristics can show whether a 
document has been inadvertently or intentionally modified, thereby performing 
a crucial function in establishing whether a document is genuine.  See Philip J. 
Favro, A New Frontier in Electronic Discovery: Preserving and Obtaining 
Metadata, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 12 (2007). 
 63. This will depend on both the Circuit the litigation is taking place and 
also whether the requesting party stipulates as to which file format the ESI 
should be produced.  See infra notes 64, 69, 71 and accompanying text. 
 64. Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 652. 
 65. Comment 9.a of The Sedona Principles uses viewability as the 
determining factor in whether something should be presumptively treated as a 
part of a “document.”  See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES 
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT 
PRODUCTION 30 (2003).  Using viewability as the standard, all metadata 
ordinarily visible to the user of the Excel spreadsheet application should 
presumptively be treated as part of the “document” and should thus be 
discoverable.  See Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 652. 
 66. Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 643. 
 67. Id. at 652. 
 68. Id. 
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Metadata was not discoverable in Wyeth v. Impax 
Laboratories, Inc., because the court determined that the 
parties had never agreed that electronic documents would be 
produced in any particular format; therefore, Wyeth had 
complied with its discovery obligations by producing the ESI 
as TIFF image files.69  Impax, furthermore, had not 
demonstrated a particularized need for the metadata.70  On 
the other hand, requesting parties most likely prefer the 
production of metadata in its unadulterated form as opposed 
to TIFF image files because image files take significantly 
longer to sift through, as they are not ordinarily text 
searchable. 
Contrary to Impax Laboratories, the court in In re 
Verisign, Inc. Securities Litigation resolved that the 
production of the TIFF image files alone was not sufficient to 
fulfill the production order, and the electronic version must 
include not only include metadata but must also be 
searchable.71  Additionally, the court in Hagenbush v. 3B6 
Sistemi Elettronici Industriali held that the party requesting 
production of documents was entitled to identical copies in 
the same form in which 3B6 USA kept them in the usual 
course of business.72 
Generally, a company that produces ESI for inspection 
pursuant to Rule 34 must produce the ESI as it is kept in the 
usual course of business.73  The company, however, should 
organize and label the ESI in accordance with the categories 
in the request for production, if the request so states.74  This 
indicates that the company will usually have to produce, to 
the best of their ability, ESI in its native, unaltered format. 
As case law appears to imply, the best practice for a 
company to ensure compliance with respect to the format of 
 
 69. Wyeth v. Impax Labs., Inc., 248 F.R.D. 169, 171 (D. Del. 2006). 
 70. Id. 
 71. In re Verisign, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 02-02270 JW, 2004 WL 2445243, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2004) (requiring that the documents be in electronic 
format is not contrary to law but is supported by the Federal Rules). 
 72. Hagenbush v. 3B6 Sistemi Elettronici Industriali, No. 04 C 3109, 2006 
WL 665005, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2006).  After the plaintiff had complied with 
the defendant’s request to visit their facility to designate which documents to be 
produced, the plaintiff is entitled not to TIFF image files of the documents 
requested but to identical electronic copies as viewed at the defendant’s facility.  
Id. at *1–2. 
 73. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E). 
 74. Id. 
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their produced data is to adhere to the viewability rule 
adopted by the Williams court.  In abiding by this rule, the 
court maintained that all metadata that is ordinarily visible 
to the user of a spreadsheet application should presumptively 
be treated as part of the document and should, thus, be 
discoverable.75  In light of the viewability rule, the company 
should include a provision in its service agreement to 
guarantee that their third-party cloud computing service 
provider will undertake the following prescriptive and 
prospective measures; preserve visible metadata on ESI, flag 
ESI containing metadata to facilitate future searches for ESI 
containing metadata, and refrain from scrubbing metadata 
away.  Therein, once the company anticipates litigation, it 
can quickly determine which documents would require the 
additional production of metadata—provided that the 
metadata has been stored in the first instance, and that it is 
either visible or specifically requested. 
Yet, to further complicate matters, data that is stored in 
random access memory (RAM) may also be subject to 
production due to Rule 34(a)’s intention that the scope of the 
production of documents be as broad as possible.76  In 
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, the court determined that 
defendants operating a torrent file search website must 
produce RAM to the plaintiff motion picture studio.77  Rule 
34(a)(1),78 as amended in 2006, encompasses data stored in 
any medium from which information can be obtained and 
does not include a carve out for information written to a 
medium that stores information only temporarily, such as 
RAM.79  Moreover, the advisory committee’s notes to the 2006 
amendments to the FRCP express that Rule 34(a)(1) “is 
intended to be broad enough to cover all current types of 
computer-based information, and flexible enough to 
encompass future changes and developments.”80 
In the wake of Bunnell, a company must be prepared to 
not only produce metadata, but also RAM related to ESI 
 
 75. See Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 652 (D. Kan. 
2005). 
 76. Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 447 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 77. See id. at 445–46. 
 78. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1). 
 79. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 245 F.R.D. at 447. 
 80. Advisory Comm. on 2006 amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1). 
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stored by their third-party cloud computing service provider if 
a requesting party specifies as such.  It is therefore advisable 
that a company contracting with a third-party cloud 
computing service provider include provisions in their service 
agreement that specify for the continued maintenance and 
retention of both metadata and RAM for applicable files, 
especially after a litigation hold has been put in place.  
Otherwise, the company faces potential spoliation sanctions 
for the deletion of this desired data.  With this protective 
provision serving as one of the terms of the service 
agreement, a company subjected to sanctions for spoliation of 
metadata and/or RAM, at the very least, may allege that the 
third-party cloud computing service provider committed a 
breach of contract in a subsequent claim against the offending 
provider. 
iv. Control of ESI 
A company that stores its data with a third-party cloud 
service provider need only produce ESI that is under the 
company’s possession, custody, or control.81  However, control 
of ESI does not require that the party have legal ownership or 
actual possession of the documents at issue.82  Rather, 
documents may be considered to fall under a party’s control 
when that party has the right, authority, or practical ability 
to obtain the documents from a non-party to the action.83  
This is particularly applicable when a company employs a 
third-party cloud computing service provider to store its data.  
In practice, courts have interpreted Rule 34 “to require 
production if the party has the practical ability to obtain the 
documents from another, irrespective of his legal entitlement 
to the documents.”84 
While the practical ability test, mentioned above, may be 
useful in assessing a party’s obligations under Rule 34, the 
control test is more useful in determining the control required 
to trigger a party’s duty to preserve evidence.85  The control 
 
 81. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1). 
 82. See In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992) (emphasis added). 
 85. Goodman v. Praxair Services, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 516 n.11 (D. 
Md. 2009). 
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test was explicated by the court in In re NTL, Inc. Securities 
Litigation, which stated that the “test for production of 
documents is control, not location . . . where the documents 
are considered to be under a party’s control when that party 
has the right, authority or practical ability to obtain the 
documents from a non-party to the action.”86 
Application of the control test to documents held by a 
third-party occurred in Tomlinson v. El Paso Corp., whereby 
the plaintiff sought to compel the production of records from a 
company controlling a pension plan who in turn had retained 
a third-party to maintain the electronic records associated 
with the pension plan.87  The company was under a duty to 
maintain certain records to comply with the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act88 and could not discharge 
this duty by having a third-party maintain its records.89  
Therefore, even though a third-party was maintaining the 
company’s records, the court determined that the company 
was still in possession, custody, or control of the documents 
because they had or should have had the authority or ability 
to obtain the requested data from the third-party.90 
Similarly, the court in Flagg91 determined that the City 
of Detroit had sufficient control of ESI to permit production 
by its third-party service provider in the face of a subpoena.92  
Sufficient control existed because the City possessed the 
authority to consent to production of text messages stored by 
its third-party service provider, SkyTel, in relation to the 
alleged murder of the plaintiff’s mother.93  The City of Detroit 
entered into a contract with SkyTel to provide the 
municipality with text messaging devices and corresponding 
services for various city officials.94  Because the City had the 
ability to grant its consent to their third-party service 
provider to obtain the records, it was considered to be in 
 
 86. In re NTL, Inc., 244 F.R.D. at 195. 
 87. Tomlinson v. El Paso Corp., 245 F.R.D. 474, 476–77 (D. Colo. 2007). 
 88. See 29 U.S.C. § 1059(a)(1) (2010).  Under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act, an employer has the responsibility of the proper 
maintenance and retention of employees’ pension and welfare plan records. 
 89. See Tomlinson, 245 F.R.D. at 477. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
 92. Id. at 354. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 347. 
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control of the ESI, and the City could not simply refuse to 
give consent and maintain that the records were out of their 
control in a Rule 34 context.95  The court in Flagg proceeded 
with its analysis under the assumption that the request for 
production of the text messages came under a Rule 34 motion 
to compel.96  The court thereby required the plaintiff to 
reformulate its discovery request from a Rule 45 subpoena97 
of SkyTel to a Rule 34 motion to compel98 upon the City of 
Detroit to avoid complications under the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).99 
Dietrich v. Bauer100 exemplified another instance in 
which a party to litigation was determined to be in control of 
information that was maintained by a third-party.  In this 
case, a parent company exercised sufficient control over the 
documents of its subsidiary to render it responsible for 
producing the requested documents.101  Likewise, those who 
engage in joint ventures have a legal right to obtain 
information from his or her fellow venturer upon demand for 
production of documents.102  With respect to data held by a 
former employee, the court in Export-Import Bank of the 
United States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co.103 found that the 
plaintiff-bank fulfilled the control test, because it had the 
apparent practical ability to obtain requested documents from 
its non-party former employee.104  Alternatively, at the very 
least, the bank was compelled to ask its former employee for 
the documents before asserting that it had no control over the 
documents in the former employee’s possession.105   
 
 95. Id. at 355. 
 96. Id. at 366. 
 97. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A). 
 98. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(D). 
 99. Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 366.  The court determined that it was unclear 
whether under the ECPA SkyTel’s records would be protected and not be 
subject to a Rule 45 subpoena for records.  See id. 
 100. Dietrich v. Bauer, 95 Civ. 7051 (RWS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11729 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2000). 
 101. Id. at *9. 
 102. Starlight Int’l, Inc. v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 635 (D. Kan. 1999) 
(stating that joint venturers have the right, authority or practical ability to 
produce documents that are held by a member of the joint venture because a 
joint venture is treated as a partnership in Kansas). 
 103. Exp.-Imp. Bank of the U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper, 233 F.R.D. 338 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 104. Id. at 341. 
 105. Id. 
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Further, the court in Tetra Technologies, Inc. v. Hamilton 
found that the defendant, a subscriber/user of a cell phone 
service, had sufficient control over his personal cell phone 
records to be obligated to produce them in the face of a Rule 
34 motion to compel.  The defendant fulfilled the control test, 
because he possessed the legal right to obtain the phone 
records, which were requested by the plaintiff.106  Again, in 
Cyntegra, Inc. v. Idexx Laboratories, Inc., the court found that 
the defendant-company satisfied the control test and 
consequently sanctioned the company for failing to make 
payments to its third-party data storage company, who in 
turn deleted the discoverable data from its servers as a result 
of this non-payment.107 
As the cases above explicate, a company that employs a 
third-party cloud computing service provider to retain data 
will be deemed by a court to be in control of the data 
maintained by the service provider for production and 
preservation purposes.108  Even though the ESI is not within 
the company’s possession, the ESI is still within the 
company’s control, because the company has the legal right to 
obtain it.109 
Few courts have commented specifically on discovery 
obligations within the context of cloud computing,110 but 
situations in which possession and control are similarly split 
between a party to the litigation and a third-party service 
provider, provide helpful analogies.111  Although the company 
has legal control of the ESI in the eyes of the court, the third-
party cloud computing service provider may refuse to retrieve 
the ESI in the proper format; respecting that the company 
needs to produce the ESI in the explicit and precise format in 
 
 106. Tetra Techs., Inc. v. Hamilton, No. CIV-07-1186-M, 2008 WL 3307150, 
at *1 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 7, 2008). 
 107. Cyntegra, Inc. v. Idexx Labs., Inc., No. CV 06-4170 PSG (CTx), 2007 WL 
5193736, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2007). 
 108. See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 354 (E.D. Mich. 2008); In re 
NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Tomlinson v. El Paso 
Corp., 245 F.R.D. 474, 477 (D. Colo. 2007). 
 109. See generally supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 110. Similarly, few courts have even mentioned cloud computing in there 
opinions except for one.  See Oregon v. Beller, 217 P.3d 1094, 1111 n.11 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2009) (Sercombe, J., dissenting). 
 111. Charles B. Molster III & Elizabeth H. Erickson, “Cloud Computing” in 
Discovery: How We Deal with Electronically Stored Information, 59 VA. LAW. 60, 
60 n.1 (2010). 
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order to comply with the opposing party’s discovery request. 
A company may avoid the problems brought by the lack 
of guidance regarding discovery obligations and cloud 
computing by adding a stipulation in its service contract with 
the third-party cloud computing service provider.  The 
contract term may allow the company, at the discretion of the 
company’s general counsel or a specified officer, to obtain ESI 
in the event of anticipated litigation within a specified 
window of time.  Whether non-parties to litigation—such as 
third-party cloud computing service providers—may hide 
behind the shield of the ECPA when subpoenaed by the 
opposing party to produce ESI is still unclear.112 
2. Mitigating Liability Under Prong II of the Zubulake 
IV Framework 
The second element of the Zubulake IV framework 
requires that a party to destroy evidence with a culpable state 
of mind in order for the imposition of sanctions for the 
violation of the duty to preserve.113  A company employing a 
third-party cloud computing service provider may address the 
culpability requirement by being proactive when drafting the 
service agreement and tailoring it to the applicable 
jurisdiction’s case law so that both parties acknowledge and 
are informed of the relevant culpability standard.  Potential 
sanctions on a scale of most to least severe include: dismissal 
of a claim or granting judgment in favor of a prejudiced party, 
suppression of evidence, an adverse inference, fines, and 
attorneys’ fees and costs.114 
Even though federal law governs the instant sanctioning 
process for spoliation of evidence, as the sanctions constitute 
evidentiary matters,115 the extent of culpability required to 
incur sanctions varies from circuit to circuit.  The range of 
culpability for destruction of ESI includes bad faith, gross 
 
 112. See Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 366. 
 113. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 220 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).  The level of culpability is of prime importance in the court’s 
determination of the appropriate sanction.  See Crist, supra note 36, at 45. 
 114. Mosaid Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335 
(D.N.J. 2004). 
 115. Se. Mech. Serv., Inc. v. Brody, No.: 8:08-CV-1151-T-30EAJ, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 69830, at *6 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2009) (citing Flury v. Daimler 
Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 944 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
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negligence, and ordinary negligence.116  Yet, once the duty to 
preserve attaches to discoverable ESI, “any destruction of 
documents is, at a minimum, negligent.”117  When a party 
seeks a sanction that would terminate litigation, such as a 
request for dismissal or default judgment, the circuits 
uniformly require a showing of bad faith.118  An adverse 
inference is an instruction to the jury that there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the lost evidence is both relevant 
and favorable to the questing party’s claims or defenses.119  
The showing of culpability required for an adverse inference 
instruction varies by circuit court.120 
A reflection of the fragmentation among the circuit courts 
begins with the lowest level of culpability necessary for the 
imposition of sanctions, whereby a court, within the Second 
Circuit, in Pension Comm. of the University of Montreal v. 
Banc of America Securities, LLC, imposed an adverse 
inference after finding that the defendant had destroyed ESI 
in a manner amounting to gross negligence.121  The Second 
Circuit further allows for the imposition of an adverse 
inference based on negligent destruction alone.122  In the 
First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, bad faith is not essential 
for imposing an adverse inference as long as there is severe 
prejudice—although the presence of bad faith is often 
emphasized.123  The Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. 
 
 116. See Cross & Kuwahara, supra note 8, at 11 n.52. 
 117. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 220. 
 118. Crist, supra note 36, at 45. 
 119. Pension Comm. of Montreal Univ. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. 
Supp. 2d 456, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 120. See Cross & Kuwahara, supra note 8, at 11 n.59. 
 121. See Pension Comm. of Montreal Univ., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 470. 
 122. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (stating that “[t]he sanction of an adverse inference may be 
appropriate in some cases involving negligent destruction of evidence because 
each party should bear the risk of its own negligence”). 
 123. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir. 
2001) (holding that dismissal is usually justified only in circumstances of bad 
faith but even where conduct is less culpable, dismissal may be necessary if the 
prejudice to the other party is extraordinary); Sacramona v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 444, 447 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Certainly  bad 
faith is a proper and important consideration in deciding whether and how to 
sanction conduct resulting in the destruction of evidence.  But bad faith is not 
essential.”); Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that 
a trial court has broad discretionary power to permit a jury to draw an adverse 
inference from the spoliation against the party responsible for such behavior). 
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Circuits impose an adverse inference only after finding bad 
faith.124  Likewise, in Rimkus Consulting Group v. 
Cammarata, a decision rendered within the Eleventh Circuit, 
the court required a showing of bad faith to impose an 
adverse inference.125  The Third Circuit follows a more unique 
approach by balancing the degrees of fault and prejudice to 
determine the culpability of the spoliating party and the 
appropriate sanctions.126 
Regardless of the level of culpability that applies, an 
enterprise employing a cloud computing service provider has 
a safe harbor from the imposition of sanctions.  An enterprise 
may employ this safe harbor, under Rule 37(e), if their cloud 
computing service provider routinely destroys data in “good-
faith.”127  More specifically, under Rule 37(e), sanctions are 
inappropriate (1) where electronic communications are 
destroyed pursuant to a computer system’s routine 
operations, and (2) where there is no evidence that the system 
was operated in bad faith.128  Regardless, once litigation is 
anticipated, as discussed in Part I.B.1.i, the company 
certainly should instruct its third-party cloud computing 
service provider to disable all routine destruction policies and 
place a litigation hold on their relevant ESI.129 
 
 124. See, e.g., Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1149 (10th 
Cir. 2009) (“Mere negligence in losing or destroying records is not enough . . . .”) 
(quoting Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997)); Faas v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 644 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that in order to 
draw an adverse inference, “we must find that Sears intentionally destroyed the 
documents in bad faith.”); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1035 
(8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a spoliation of evidence sanction requires a finding 
of intentional destruction). 
 125. Rimkus Consulting Grp. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 614 (S.D. 
Tex. 2010).  The Eleventh Circuit also requires bad faith for an adverse 
inference.  See Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1294 
(11th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n adverse inference is drawn from a party’s failure to 
preserve evidence only when the absence of that evidence is predicated on bad 
faith.”) (quoting Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929, 931 (11th Cir. 1997)). 
 126. See Mosaid Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335 
(D.N.J. 2004) (noting that “three key considerations dictate whether sanctions 
are warranted: (1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the 
evidence; (2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and (3) 
whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness . . .”). 
 127. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 128. Se. Mech. Serv., Inc. v. Brody, No.: 8:08-CV-1151-T-30EAJ, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 69830, at *13 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2009). 
 129. See, e.g., Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 60 (D.D.C. 2007) (imposing 
sanctions for failure to turn off an automatic deletion feature once informed of 
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As discussed earlier, the level of culpability that will 
warrant the imposition of sanctions varies among the circuit 
courts, especially for the imposition of an adverse inference.  
Still, once the duty to preserve attaches, “any destruction of 
documents is, at a minimum, negligent.”130  Therefore, an 
enterprise employing a third-party cloud computing service 
provider must draft their service agreement in such a fashion, 
where once a litigation hold is triggered the routine 
destruction of ESI is immediately disabled.  The enterprise 
should also make reasonable efforts to become knowledgeable 
and stay informed of which circuit’s culpability jurisprudence 
is applicable when drafting their service agreement. 
More specifically, it is strongly advised that the 
enterprise negotiate in an indemnity provision commensurate 
with the most current case law in the jurisdiction that applies 
to the service agreement.  The indemnity provision should 
include some flexibility that anticipates the possibility for 
case law in the corresponding jurisdiction to become stricter 
with regards to their interpretation of the second element of 
the Zubulake IV framework. 
3. Mitigating Liability Under Prong III of the Zubulake 
IV Framework 
The third and final element of the Zubulake IV 
framework requires that “the destroyed evidence was 
relevant to the party’s claim or defense such that a 
reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that 
claim or defense” before sanctions may be imposed by the 
court for failure to preserve ESI.131  “Relevant” in this context 
is defined as something more than sufficiently probative132 to 
 
pending litigation without finding bad faith); Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’n 
Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 511–12 (D. Md. 2005) (finding that Echostar had engaged 
in gross spoliation because it had failed to suspend its email and data 
destruction policy once litigation was reasonably anticipated); Rambus, Inc. v. 
Infineon Techs. AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 282 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“[O]nce a party 
reasonably anticipates litigation, it has a duty to suspend any routine document 
purging system that might be in effect and to put in place a litigation hold to 
ensure the preservation of relevant document—failure to do so constitutes 
spoliation.”). 
 130. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 220 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d 
Cir. 2002). 
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satisfy Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.133  If ESI is 
destroyed in bad faith, either intentionally or willfully, this 
fact alone is enough to establish relevance.134  In the absence 
of bad faith, however, this element must be established by the 
submission of extrinsic evidence demonstrating the absent 
evidence would have been favorable to the party seeking 
sanctions.135 
In terms of approaching this third prong, the best 
practice for a company anticipating litigation is to produce 
ESI that is relevant within the context of Rule 401 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, whereby the ESI must be more 
than sufficiently probative.136  If ESI does not meet the Rule 
401 threshold, the company should use its best judgment in 
withholding the ESI.  If the ESI is not destroyed in bad faith, 
the third prong of the Zubulake IV framework appears to be 
more preferential to the producing party rather than the 
requesting party, or the party seeking to impose sanctions, as 
it places a fairly heightened burden of proof upon the latter to 
locate and provide extrinsic evidence with a tendency to show 
that the missing evidence would have been favorable to its 
position. 
III. PROACTIVE MEASURES TO LESSEN THE RISK OF SANCTIONS 
FOR SPOLIATION OF ESI 
In today’s business environment, companies are 
outsourcing more of their data services, both data storage and 
processing, which is leading to the emergence and rapid 
adoption of cloud computing solutions that entail third-party 
administration and control of basic technology services.137  In 
light of this new method of storing ESI, companies must 
make additional efforts to reduce the risk of court sanctions 
and liability by drafting advantageous provisions in service 
agreements with a third-party cloud computing service 
provider in contemplation of prospective litigation and lack of 
 
 133. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 134. Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 220. 
 135. Chan v. Triple 8 Palace, Inc., 03 Civ. 6048 (GEL) (JCF), 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16520, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2005). 
 136. Residential Funding Corp., 306 F.3d at 108. 
 137. See Renee T. Lawson, Cloud Computing and IT Outsourcing - 
Unforeseen Hiccups for E-Discovery in the Wake of Quon v. Arch Wireless?, 832 
PLI/LIT 203, 212–13 (2010). 
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cooperation by the service provider.  A company may be 
subject to liability if its third-party cloud computing service 
provider’s actions relating to the company’s ESI, which 
includes their non-compliance with a request to produce ESI 
because, as case law has demonstrated (e.g., the commonly 
used control test from In re NTL, Inc.) the company holds 
control over its ESI even if the company does not have 
possession of the ESI.138  The company therefore needs to 
implement a provision in the service agreement with its 
third-party cloud computing service provider, which enables 
one of the company’s agents, such as the general counsel or a 
specified corporate officer, to demand that ESI be handed 
over to the company within a short period of time. 
The company must also have the ability to quickly place 
a litigation hold on specified relevant ESI, and to direct its 
third-party service provider to disable routine deletion 
procedures to stave off spoliation sanctions.  Further, in the 
event of a Rule 34 request for ESI, provisions must be 
incorporated into the service agreement whereby the cloud 
computing service provider can produce metadata and, also, 
RAM, if necessary.  A contractual provision should 
additionally be added to the company’s service agreement, 
whereby, in the event that the third-party cloud computing 
service provider is subpoenaed, the company’s counsel will 
receive a notice of all subpoenas that concern the company’s 
ESI as well as a right of first refusal over the service 
provider’s production of the company’s ESI. 
The service agreement should also address which party 
incurs liability for sanctions stemming from any spoliation of 
the company’s ESI.  An indemnification clause in the service 
agreement could provide indemnification for the company 
from the third-party cloud computing service provider for all 
sanctions resulting from the service provider’s destruction of 
relevant ESI after the company has put a litigation hold on 
such relevant ESI.  In addition to contractual provisions, the 
company should apprise the judge in a Rule 26 discovery 
conference that the company’s relevant ESI will need to be 
obtained from its third-party cloud computing service 
provider.  In doing so, the judge will be able to take into 
account the additional complications inherent in first 
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obtaining ESI from a third-party for production in the 
discovery plan and also be subject to the court’s order. 
Finally, an enterprise engaged in litigation should 
consider the creation of a private network on the contracted 
third-party cloud computing service provider’s system.  Such 
a system would allow an opposing/moving party to directly 
access the requested ESI.  Not only would such a system 
facilitate the requesting party’s access for the requested ESI 
in its native format, it would also enable the producing party 
to restrict access exclusively within the bounds of discovery.  
Such a mechanism benefits both the requesting and 
producing parties: on the one hand, it would allow the 
requesting party access to what they precisely seek and, on 
the other, reassure the producing party that the ESI 
produced is only the ESI responsive to the discovery request 
and nothing more is at risk of being inadvertently disclosed. 
CONCLUSION 
As the shift towards the usage of third-party cloud 
computing service providers continues to grow, a company 
employing these services must adjust to the many facets and 
challenges that electronic discovery will potentially pose.  A 
company itself holds the burden of drafting a service 
agreement that provides protection from liability for the 
spoliation of ESI by third-party cloud computing service 
providers.  Sanctions for the spoliation of ESI are costly and 
can be crippling to litigation, as described supra with 
reference to adverse inferences.139  To prevent this foreseeable 
consequence, it is strongly recommended that a company—in 
drafting their third-party cloud computing service 
agreement—integrate provisions that call for the 
implementation of litigation holds ceasing routine spoliation 
procedures when the enterprise anticipates litigation.  
Provisions that clearly establish whose ESI will be retained, 
the scope of ESI to be retained, in what form, and how it will 
be retained are also helpful in providing clear delineations of 
liability.  By taking the proactive steps discussed in this 
Comment towards insulating itself from potential discovery 
 
 139. See Mosaid Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335 
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sanctions, a company may more comfortably allow its data to 
“enter the cloud.” 
 
